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THE PERUVIAN MILITARY'S ROLE IN  
SUSTAINING DEMOCRACY

by

Phillip Gales, Major, United States Air Force

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Advisor: Lieutenant Colonel Charles E. Costanzo

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama

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## *Contents*

	<i>Page</i>
DISCLAIMER .....	ii
TABLES .....	iv
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS .....	v
ABSTRACT.....	vi
INTRODUCTION .....	1
INTRAGOVERNMENTAL THREATS TO DEMOCRACY .....	4
Military Involvement in Politics.....	4
Coups d'état: A Historical and Qualitative Perspective .....	4
Presidential Self-Coup of 1992.....	5
Military Subordination under Civilian Control .....	7
Military Corruption.....	9
Military Respect for Human Rights.....	10
NON-GOVERNMENTAL THREATS TO DEMOCRACY .....	16
Insurgency.....	16
Narcotics.....	19
Territorial Integrity .....	23
Peru-Ecuador Territorial Dispute .....	23
Peru-Chile Territorial Dispute.....	24
CONCLUSION.....	26
BIBLIOGRAPHY .....	29

## *Tables*

	<i>Page</i>
Table 1. Peruvian Coca Production and Eradication .....	21
Table 2. Peruvian Cocaine Seizures.....	21

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### *Abstract*

Peru has experienced considerable political turmoil since attaining statehood in 1821. The military has routinely been at the center of this turmoil, with coups d'état having been a recurring theme in the country's evolution. Peru's most recent attempt at democracy—which commenced in 1980 after 12 years of authoritarian military rule—has been particularly challenging because it coincided with the commencement of an insurgent movement of unprecedented violence and vigor. Further exacerbating matters, Peru's democratically elected leaders have had to tread lightly on military prerogatives in order to insure against their overthrow.

President Alberto Fujimori's strong-hand tactics and misuse of the military as his instrument of domestic political power represent the latest obstacle to Peru's democratization. Trends throughout Latin America since the 1980s reflect a precipitous decline in the domestic power of armed forces. Because this does not necessarily hold true for Peru, the country's democracy is in jeopardy. This research project assesses the Peruvian military's contribution to the country's post-1980 democratization. The methodology employed involves an examination of the military's track record in those areas the author considers critical to Peru's democratic evolution. These include the military's involvement in politics, subordination under civilian control, corruption, respect for human rights, effectiveness in combating insurgency and counternarcotics, and preservation of the state's territorial integrity. Even though the armed forces have demonstrated noteworthy improvement in many of these areas, the future of Peru's democratization remains uncertain.

## **Part 1**

### **Introduction**

Peru has remained under the United States' watchful eye as it endured recurring coups d'état, periods of authoritarian rule, cold war flirtations with China and communist states of the Warsaw Pact, an overwhelming communist insurgency, and a massive drug war. Upon returning to civilian-controlled government in 1980, Peru broke its twelve-year and most recent chain of military rule, seemingly making significant strides toward democratization. However, the tremendous domestic challenge of combating insurgency prompted civilian leaders gradually to accord the military more power than would be considered healthy in most democratic societies. On 5 April 1992, President Alberto Fujimori further complicated matters by using the military to help him stage his presidential "self-coup" just two years after his first democratic election to the presidency. He subsequently created an autocratic government which, in effect, stymied Peru's democratization process. Although the Peruvian military is presently under civilian control, the president continues to employ the institution as his political power base. Moreover, the army's excessive autonomy in internal security functions has placed it at the very center of countless human rights violations.

The United States' primary national interest vis-à-vis Peru focuses on transnational issues, particularly drug trafficking (*A National Security Strategy* 39). As one of the core objectives of the United States National Security Strategy, promoting democracy and human rights holds a



high priority as well (*A National Security Strategy* 41). Stability throughout Latin America is yet another key interest. Promoting amicable international cooperation and controlling insurgent activity are paramount to this regional stability (USSOUTHCOM).

This project will examine the role of the Peruvian military in this volatile country's post-authoritarian democratization. The term "democracy" continually evades universal definition. A minimalist definition would be: "a system of governance in which an inclusive adult population is free to engage in individual and collective forms of political action and in which rulers are selected through open, competitive, peaceful, and regularly scheduled elections" (Hunter 6). In its "Declaration of Managua for the Promotion of Democracy and Human Rights," the Organization of American States (comprised of 35 North and Latin American states, including Peru), declares a need to consolidate democracies which "encourage freedom and social justice, safeguard human rights, and favor progress" (OAS 111). The Organization of American States further proclaims that democratic structures should be "based on the balance and independence of the branches of government" (OAS 112). This work combines the interpretations of Dr. Hunter and the Organization of American States to define democracy as: a system of government (1) in which rulers are selected through open, competitive, peaceful, and regularly scheduled elections, (2) which maintains balance and independence of its branches, and (3) which protects and provides for freedom, social justice, human rights, security, and national progress.

History has demonstrated the Peruvian military's capability to influence all the elements comprising this definition. Therefore, this paper will explore the post-1980 evolution of this influence with regard to those politico-military areas that most significantly impact Peru's democratic evolution. More specifically, Part 2 will review the intra-governmental issues of

military involvement in politics, acceptance of subordination under civilian control, corruption, and human rights practices. Part 3 will examine the military's contribution to combating non-governmental threats to Peru's democracy. These include insurgency, the narcotics trade, and territorial integrity. Finally, Part 4 will provide a concluding assessment.

The politico-military situation in Peru is volatile and could readily change the dynamics of both the contemporary developments and future potential scenarios detailed in this work. In light of this very real possibility, it is important that the reader keep in mind the information cut-off date of this research project is 8 February 2000. A principal limitation of this effort revolves around the fact that the Peruvian military and national police share responsibility for internal security functions. On occasion, military leaders have actually commanded police forces within specific regions. Because of these blurred lines of responsibility and authority, available literature often cites the activities and/or behavioral transgressions of Peru's security forces without differentiating between the police and armed forces. Similarly, the activities of the National Intelligence Service and Military Intelligence Service are often grouped together. To the extent possible, this paper isolates the activities of the military. Another limitation is the geographic and fiscal factors that preclude this author from interviewing Peruvian officials capable of providing unique insight into the subject.

## Part 2

### Intragovernmental Threats to Democracy

#### Military Involvement in Politics

*The political attitudes of military officers have an especially pronounced impact on their actions. The most salient of officers' political attitudes refer to political order, political activity, and the governing states. They are both characteristic of and distinctive of the officer corps.*

— Eric A. Nordlinger

Since Peru's 1980 recovery from authoritarian rule, members of the police and military have been constitutionally prohibited from voting (US House *Country Reports* 1991, 718). Another significant law bars organizations advocating the overthrow of the government from participating in the political process (US House *Country Reports* 1998, 752). These measures, however, were implemented too late to prevent the military's multiple incursions into Peruvian politics.

#### Coups d'état: A Historical and Qualitative Perspective

Peru's armed forces have undermined the democratic processes by either leading or directly supporting every Peruvian coup d'état except one—the coup of 1895, in which civilians overthrew a military dictatorship (Payne 58). Surprisingly, it is not democratic elections, but the coup d'état that has proven to be the most prevalent means of Peruvian transfer of government

(Payne 3). In 1968, Arnold Payne accounted for 11 coups d'état since, and including, 1895; six of these were from below, while the remaining five were imposed from above (58). Adding the coup d'état of October 1968 and Fujimori's 1992 self-coup raises the total count to 13, with 7 conducted from below and 6 from above. Particularly noteworthy is the fact that only one of the seven coups from below was not headed by the military; meanwhile, Fujimori's self-coup is the only coup from above not imposed by an incumbent dictatorial regime (Payne 58).

Payne differentiates between the typical and significant coup, characterizing the former as having minimal political significance "beyond the immediate transfer of political power from one regime to another" (1). Conversely, significant coups have a profound long-term impact on the state's political system and produce the following unique changes: "(1) the adoption of a new position by the leaders of the armed forces regarding their guardianship function; (2) the assumption of executive power by a new political elite; (3) a realignment of the country's political power contenders; and (4) a new role (or lack of one) for political parties" (Payne 1). Based on these guidelines, only the coups of 1895, 1914, 1962, and 1968 would qualify as significant.

### **Presidential Self-Coup of 1992**

On 5 April 1992, President Fujimori suspended Peru's 1979 Constitution, disbanded the national Congress, and restructured the judiciary—relieving 13 of the Supreme Court's 28 judges on the ostensible grounds of "corruption and incompetence" (Radu). By the following morning soldiers had seized control of key media facilities, and congressional representatives discovered that the Peruvian Army was blocking entry to their former workplace (Andreas). Though this coup would not be categorized as "significant" (under Payne's criteria), it nonetheless merits considerable attention because it represents the most radical reversal in Peru's post-1980

democratization process and, as already mentioned earlier, is the first coup from above conducted by a non-dictatorial leader.

In November 1992, a more malleable and pro-Fujimori Democratic Constituent Congress was elected. This body promptly redrafted the Constitution, which the people subsequently endorsed via by the requisite public referendum. The 1993 Constitution allowed, *inter alia*, the president to serve two consecutive terms, rather than only one permitted under the superseded 1979 constitution. In 1996, the pro-Fujimori congressional majority passed a law proclaiming that he could run for a third term because his second term (which began in 1995) was his first full term since the 1993 ratification of the new Constitution ("Congress"). However, when Peru's Constitutional Tribunal ruled in early 1997 that the law was unconstitutional, Congress removed the four dissenting judges, leaving the body unable to convene for lack of a quorum (US House *Country Reports* 1998, 737 ; "Congress"). This chain of events demonstrates that Fujimori's has governmental control and influence well beyond the average democratic Executive.

The president has further bolstered his power by having—or at least allowing—the military to operate as his "enforcer." In April 1991, for instance, the army "disappeared" all six left-wing candidates running in the small town election of Huancapi, Ayacucho (Poole 15). More recently, the Military Intelligence Service (SIE) and National Intelligence Service (SIN) have been employed as instruments of political intimidation. Both organizations have repeatedly been accused of utilizing illegal wiretaps as well as verbal and physical threats to influence opposition politicians, local governments, and independent journalists as Fujimori continues to position himself for the April 2000 presidential election ("Spotlight"; "Fujimori Defends" 284; "Murder"). These commonplace actions demonstrate both Fujimori's ability to readily usurp the

balance and independence of the governmental branches, which the Organization of American States considers so integral to contemporary democracy, and his blatant disregard for democratic ideals. It is important to note that although the military is not directly responsible for the Executive's manipulation of the legislative and judicial branches, in all cases it is providing him the all-important umbrella of political security he needs to effectively conduct the actions.

### **Military Subordination under Civilian Control**

In 1980, President Fernando Belaúnde, who had been deposed in the 1968 coup, returned to the presidency. He initiated—and the armed forces accepted—measures limiting the military's autonomy. Two such steps were the establishment of a constitutional stipulation requiring that Congress ratify all flag-level promotions and the deactivation of those arms of the nation's intelligence apparatus formerly responsible for monitoring civil society (Obando 108). The latter measure is admirable in its resultant preservation of the citizens' human right to privacy. However, it undoubtedly was implemented not for altruistic reasons, but as a means of ensuring the intelligence apparatus retained less power than the new Executive. Belaúnde was extremely hesitant during the first two years of the Shining Path insurrection (1980-1982) to involve the military over concern that the institution might gain excessive power (Poole 5). At the same time, though, he allowed the military to continue controlling its own arms acquisitions and overall budget, which during the early years of his administration actually equaled or exceeded the budget under the 1968-1980 military regime (Obando 108). Clearly, Belaúnde had good reason to walk the tightrope cautiously between implementing controls over and according prerogatives to the military. After all, any overly drastic or careless measure on his part could have precipitated his second overthrow by military coup.

Alan García, president from 1985-1990, was equally concerned with the possibility of a coup. As a result, he sought both to co-opt the armed forces and to control their national-level power. Despite the military's objections, García established a Ministry of Defense as a means of controlling his armed professionals. At the same time, he co-opted influential military flag officers by promising them state appointments in exchange for their political support (Obando 111). Military pay, privileges, and status declined to the point that two military coups were planned during García's term: lower-ranking officers envisaged overthrowing García and his co-opted high command, while the generals within the high command were considering a preemptive coup of their own (Obando 112). Neither plan was executed, however.

Shortly after taking office in 1990, President Fujimori expanded upon his predecessor's strategy of military co-optation. He immediately placed military generals in the posts of Minister of Defense and Minister of the Interior, and subsequently appointed four other generals to cabinet-level positions (Poole 14). Securing the support of the armed forces was especially important to Fujimori because he had—and continues to have—no political party from which to derive political strength. Consequently, a legislative decree promulgated in November 1991 stipulates that the president will appoint all high command officials, who are to serve through the president's tenure in office unless he relieves them earlier (Obando 114). This clever measure allows the president to place his most loyal flag officers in preeminent military billets, thereby protecting the office of the Executive (Obando 114). In fact, it is this top-level military loyalty that allowed Fujimori to conduct his self-coup. However, Fujimori's co-optation strategy provides a double-edged sword. A major problem revolves around the president's politicization of the military, as it has engendered a clear division between officers loyal to the president and those loyal to the military as an institution (Obando 114). As a result in November 1992,

institutionalist members of the military attempted an unsuccessful coup d'état against President Fujimori and his co-opted high command flag officers (Obando 114). The pronounced rift between institutionalist and co-opted officers provides great potential for a future coup from below. Thus, although the military is subordinated under civilian control, military seniors wield considerable political power at the national level and institutional subordination remains tenuous.

### **Military Corruption**

Most documented corruption within Peru's military is linked to the drug trade. The low salaries of military personnel and their autonomy in the country's isolated, drug-producing regions combine to make them vulnerable to the financial enticements of this industry. According to Poole and Rénique

On the day of the coup, [the United States] Assistant Secretary of State...arrived in Lima with a list of Peruvian military personnel which the State Department believed to have close ties with drug trafficking. Far from purging such officers, Fujimori's new government gave them an even more prominent role. According to an 18 April article in *The Miami Herald*, Montesinos [Fujimori's close adviser and National Intelligence director] was able after the coup to strengthen the position of military officers with known ties to the drug trade. (202)

The US Department of State's assessment of narcotics-related corruption for 1992 makes no direct reference to this internal maneuvering. It does indicate, however, that the Peruvian National Police "removes personnel who are reliably reported to be corrupt from drug enforcement positions, but disciplinary action beyond transfer is not common" (USDOS 1993 INCSR 124). This statement reflects a governmental proclivity to protect security forces known to be corrupt. One could reasonably expect—especially based on the above-cited assertion—that the military is no exception. Other sources reflect military complicity with narco-traffickers in Peru's Upper Huallaga Valley, where authorities reportedly have received payment for illegal flights departing the area's clandestine airstrips (Torrens). Though the Department of State's



official record does not cite such activity, it has reported other transgressions. Peruvian naval vessels and Air Force aircraft, for example, have been discovered shipping drugs (USDOS 1997 INCSR 104). In 1996, for instance, authorities discovered 169 kilograms of cocaine on the presidential plane and 57 and 120-kilogram loads aboard two Navy ships (Jensen).

On a more positive note, the Peruvian government has demonstrated its willingness to take legal action against military personnel corrupted by the narcotics industry. In 1994, the Army announced that its inspector general had investigated 200 narcotics-related transgressions, which resulted in disciplinary action to include discharge (USDOS 1995 INCSR 103). Since then numerous other Peruvian Army officers have been investigated for corruption, and even a general was convicted (USDOS 1997 INCSR 104). The State Department has maintained for many years that there is no evidence of institutional or high-level corruption, but recognizes that lower-level corruption among military and police personnel is harder to control (USDOS 1999 INCSR). On the other hand, some corruption cases effectively have been swept under the carpet by the military's unwillingness to transfer jurisdiction to the civilian court system (USDOS 1996 INCSR 102).

### **Military Respect for Human Rights**

*Democracy is not a place to which we arrive. It is rather a process to which a society commits itself. If we accept that democracy is not a place to which one arrives and rests, we should know that guardians of human rights guide us in that democratic process.*

— Harriet C. Babbit, US Ambassador to the OAS

In Congressional hearings, expert witnesses traced Peru's human rights dilemma directly back to the Shining Path insurgency. Established in the early 1970s, the Shining Path commenced its guerrilla war in May 1980 (US House *Human Rights* 3, 6). By late 1982, local

police forces were unable to contain the Shining Path's terror campaign, which was characterized by the indiscriminate killing, mutilation, and torture of countless unarmed civilians. Consequently, in December 1982, President Belaúnde was finally compelled to declare eight of Peru's 185 provinces emergency zones and to place them under the political-military authority of the armed forces (Poole 6). Under this regional military dominance, repression throughout the emergency zones reached all-time highs and "human rights abuses previously unknown in Peru became routine" (US House *Human Rights* 46). Placing their stranglehold on citizens' liberties, the security forces commonly arrested individuals arbitrarily (US House *Human Rights* 41). The military and police are also responsible for numerous disappearances. According to the Peruvian Attorney General's files, some 1,300 civilians had been reported as "disappeared" as of 1985 (US House *Human Rights* 17). Moreover, military forces had killed hundreds of civilians as evidenced by the unearthing of numerous mass graves, some containing up to four dozen cadavers. Many of the victims were prisoners who had been blindfolded and subsequently shot in the head execution style (US House *Human Rights* 41-43). Further aggravating matters, Belaúnde's administration did not adequately demand military accountability for its atrocities (US House *Human Rights* 5). This was probably attributable to the president's concerns over alienating the military. Not only was a potential coup a problem, but also Peru desperately needed its military to wage war against the insurgency, by whatever means proved effective.

Shortly after his 28 July 1985 presidential inauguration, Alan García swiftly initiated measures to curb the military's human rights abuses. He dismissed three flag-level military officials who were stonewalling the investigation of the military's September 1985 massacre of 69 rural peasants, and vowed to prosecute personnel directly involved in the atrocity (US House *Human Rights* 6, 31). Under his administration, the number of emergency zones expanded to

include 56 provinces (Poole 12). Since then, however, both the state of emergency and human rights matters have improved steadily. Still, the international community maintains a close watch on Peruvian human rights abuses, which remain problematic.

As of 1999, the span of emergency zones now encompasses only 16 percent of Peru (US House *Country Reports 1998*, 738). As of December 1998, 2,371 disappearance cases remained unresolved, but 1997 and 1998 saw no reports of disappearances at the hands of Peruvian military or police forces (US House *Country Reports 1997*, 622; US House *Country Reports 1998*, 741). This two-year period represented the first break in newly reported disappearances since the early 1980s. Equally encouraging is President Fujimori's February 1998 promulgation of legislation that formally condemns both forced disappearance and torture. This legislation supplemented the long-standing constitutional prohibition on torture. Present statutes call for a maximum of 15 years imprisonment for individuals found responsible for disappearances, 5 to 10-year sentences for personnel convicted of torture, and 8 to 20-year sentences for torture resulting in death (US House *Country Reports 1998*, 740). This law overcame the military's long-standing resistance to trying torture suspects in civilian courts and clearly has the potential of holding security forces more accountable than ever for their actions. What remains to be seen, however, is whether the military administrative and judicial apparatus will, as they have in the past, protect armed forces personnel who commit such crimes. The military most commonly commits its human rights violations in the emergency zones (where some constitutional protections are legally suspended) or in military detention facilities (where terrorist and treason suspects/convicts are confined) (US House *Country Reports 1998*, 741). Unfortunately, both areas remain subject to minimal Peruvian civilian and international community oversight. Moreover, the ease with which Peruvian legislation and presidential decrees regarding the

disposition of culpability for human rights abuses are promulgated presages an uncertain future regarding Peru's stance on human rights infringements. As an example, leniency took the form of a June 1995 amnesty law absolving police and military personnel who, in the conduct of counter-terrorism operations between May 1980 and June 1985, committed human rights violations (US House *Country Reports* 1995, 504). Although the rationale for this law certainly focused on Peru's dire state of crisis during that time period, the congressionally-passed amnesty remains suspect among international human rights watch groups. Juxtaposition of the 1995 and 1998 legislation demonstrates how legislative leniency versus severity can wax and wane with relative ease.

The issue of judicial legitimacy and due process poses another obstacle to progress in the human rights arena. Interestingly, treason or aggravated terrorism cases may only be tried within the military court system, whose judges' professional legal training is minimal to non-existent. Many military judges are actually active-duty line officers (US House *Country Reports* 1998, 745). A key reason for placing these high-profile trials under military jurisdiction was that the judges, who generally remain anonymous (or "faceless") to the defendants, would be less susceptible to intimidation and/or violent reprisals. With time, these judges' demonstrated willingness to hand-down convictions without hesitation inspired yet another expansion of the military court's jurisdiction. Measures adopted in 1998, in response to rampant crime waves, now allow "organized crime" to be considered a form of terrorism. Consequently, criminals who use basic military weapons (e.g., assault rifles or grenades) in robberies or kidnappings are categorized as terrorists and subject to the severe justice of the military court system ("Drastic"). The international community has repeatedly criticized Peru's military court proceedings for their failure to meet international norms regarding openness, fairness, and due process. Treason and

terrorism trials are conducted under a cloak of secrecy and place defendants at a distinct disadvantage. Defendant's attorneys are not afforded the opportunity to review State's evidence files pertaining to their clients. Additionally, they may not question police or military witnesses at any time, either before or during the trial (US House *Country Reports 1998*, 746). Further aggravating matters is the fact that the civilian judicial system is rarely permitted to review the military courts' convictions (US House *Country Reports 1998*, 745). One headline-grabbing case involves the 1994 military trial of four Chilean citizens alleged to be members of Peru's Túpac Amaru Revolutionary Movement. The faceless military court presiding over the case convicted all four defendants, sentencing them to 30 years to life imprisonment for their terrorist offenses ("Fujimori Defends" 284). In May 1999, however, the Inter-American Human Rights Court—based in San José, Costa Rica—ordered Peru to retry the individuals in a Peruvian civilian court and to pay the four families \$10,000 compensation to cover legal expenses ("Fujimori Defends" 284; Burt "Fujimori"). On the same day President Fujimori articulated his refusal to abide by this ruling (Burt "Fujimori"). Within two months he had garnered congressional support of his policy, and on 7 July 1999, announced Peru's decision to disregard all future rulings of the Inter-American Human Rights Court ("Fujimori Snubs"). Despite this act of blatant defiance, Peru has made a conscious decision to remain a signatory of the Inter-American Convention on Human Rights, which details the jurisdictional authority of the Inter-American Court. This unprecedented arrangement has produced an impasse whereby the Inter-American Human Rights Court will continue reviewing Peruvian cases, while Peru chooses to ignore the Court's rulings ("Fujimori Defies"). Thus, Peru's military courts can try civilians with pro forma international oversight and virtually total domestic impunity. Conversely, defendants acquitted of treason are vulnerable to double jeopardy, as their cases may be

remanded to civilian courts for a second trial using the same evidence presented previously (US House *Country Reports 1998*, 746). On a more positive note, Peruvian Prime Minister Alberto Bustamonte announced in late October 1999, that negotiation with the Inter-American Human Rights Court could produce mutually agreeable terms. He even hinted that terrorism cases may soon be transferred from the jurisdiction of military courts to that of civilian courts ("Bustamonte" 508). If this conciliatory move comes to fruition, the aforementioned problems regarding legitimacy and due process will likely improve in view of the civilian courts' markedly better reputation in this regard.

Another area that has attracted international attention is forced conscription. Although Peru's constitution mandates two-years of compulsory military service, personal connections and bribes often allow individuals to shirk their civic responsibility. Consequently, lower class youth in rural areas are often targeted for forced conscription. In an effort to tighten the reigns on forced conscription, legislation passed in November 1998 prohibits such activity. Nonetheless, shortly after the law's passage the military forcibly conscripted 16 young males in the rural town of Piura. (US House *Country Reports 1998*, 748)

Peru's security forces have without doubt been the government's greatest violators of human rights. Government supporters have contended that these violations are minor compared to the atrocities committed by the insurgent groups themselves, and are a small price to pay for preserving the nation. However, the authorities must be held to a higher standard than the insurgents who threaten governmental legitimacy. Fortunately, legislation passed as well as the military's demonstrated gradual advances in the above-cited areas demonstrates Peru's recognition of this fact. Thus, Peru's improving human rights record of the past 15 years holds promise for the future.

### Part 3

## Non-Governmental Threats to Democracy

### Insurgency

Insurgency arguably has been the greatest threat to Peru's fledgling democracy. The activities of the Shining Path (also known as *Sendero Luminoso*) and the Túpac Amaru Revolutionary Movement produced domestic anarchy, which directly challenged the government's legitimacy. This in turn led to the national state of emergency and the draconian governmental countermeasures cited earlier in the human rights portion of this work. In response to the Shining Path's ability to operate virtually at will from 1980-1982, the country waged a military war against the insurgent group. By 1984, this military counteroffensive had produced over 5,000 deaths, most of which were civilian; yet the Shining Path movement maintained its momentum (Degregori 82).

Ironically, as Degregori recognizes, it is the Shining Path's war against the government that "helped pave the way for an *autogolpe* [i.e., Fujimori's 1992 self-coup] that enjoyed popular support" (84). The general populace of Peru—which had been victimized by the insurgents' random acts of violence and human rights abuses for over one decade—was prepared to cede some of its constitutional entitlements and even tolerate the government's human rights violations in exchange for the prospect of domestic and personal security. Since Fujimori's self-coup the country's two insurgency movements have diminished in both power and size. This is

in great measure the result of two key factors: (1) several presidential decrees which strengthened the military's prerogatives in Peru's all-out war against insurgency and (2) Fujimori's success in curbing Peru's hyperinflation (Degregori 85, 86). Economic hardship had produced popular discontent, thereby facilitating the insurgent's campaign to recruit members or, at least, to garner peasant support. However, the combination of Peru's economic improvement, insurgent abuses against the public, and military successes effectively squelched the Shining Path and Túpac Amaru's recruitment campaigns. In fact, Civic Defense Committees—comprised of civilian peasants charged with conducting armed patrols in direct support of military counterinsurgency operations—increased in popularity and membership (Degregori 89). This is particularly significant considering the fact that in the 1980s, the general public actively resisted governmental attempts to implement such a program.

The government dealt the Shining Path its greatest losses by capturing the organization's key leaders. In September 1992, the security forces captured the Shining Path's founder and leader, Abimael Guzmán, along with other leaders. While in solitary confinement, Guzmán urged his followers to end the war and negotiate with the government; many actually heeded his pleas, while an aggressive minority temporarily maintained a low profile and subsequently fought on ("Glimmering"). Although these hard core members remained active, the group has since lost much of its fervor and effectiveness ("Sendero Dissidents"). More recently, in July 1999, the military captured Oscar Ramirez Durán—considered the last diehard Shining Path commander. Fujimori characterized this as the government's mortal blow against the movement. However, Ramirez Durán was immediately replaced by "Comrade Artemio," considered to be "the last Shining Path leader of any note" ("Guerrillas Prove"). The estimated 180 troops under Artemio's command have conducted several successful offensives against military patrols. In an



obvious effort to preserve its existence, the Shining Path has publicized its new policy of halting indiscriminate attacks against villages and ceasing to punish individual citizens who do not abide by guerrillas' demands ("Guerrillas Prove"). The long-term effect of the captures and new Shining Path policies remains to be seen. It seems, however, that the Shining Path is doing too little, too late to win the public over to its side. Moreover, the Shining Path continues to dwindle in both numbers and political strength.

The Túpac Amaru Revolutionary Movement, established in 1984, has been far less threatening to Peruvian democracy than its more potent insurgent rival, the Shining Path. The military handed the Túpac Amaru a tremendous setback in mid-1992 and again in December 1995 by capturing its top leaders (Burt "Unsettled"; "Republic"). The remnants of Túpac Amaru suffered their deathblow in April 1997. At that time, 140 Peruvian special forces military personnel impressed the world, as the national and international television media broadcast live their swift end to the Túpac Amaru's 126-day siege of the Japanese embassy residence (Witkin). This overwhelmingly successful rescue of 71 of the 72 hostages demonstrated the military's ability to handle the most delicate of terrorist situations, instilling considerable public confidence in the armed forces. The Túpac Amaru maintains a meager existence but, for all intents and purposes, is no longer a player in Peru's national scene.

It is apparently a mere matter of time before the government can claim total victory in its war against insurgency. As a minimum, one can accurately state that the military has gained the upper hand, public admiration, and intra-governmental respect for its various counterinsurgency successes.

## Narcotics

Peru holds the dubious distinction of being the world's largest producer of coca. Because Peru is responsible for only a small share of global opium poppy and negligible cannabis cultivation, combined Peruvian-United States counternarcotics efforts have focused primarily—though not exclusively—on stemming Peru's cocaine production. Counternarcotics operations in Peru have involved a multifaceted approach built around reducing coca cultivation and cocaine base exports through eradication, deterrence, and seizure.

President Fujimori has taken countering the narcotics industry more seriously than his predecessors. This enhanced priority is attributable to his early recognition that both the Shining Path and Túpac Amaru actively promoted, and benefited from, coca production (USDOS 1991 INCSR 115, 120). Before 1994, Peru had not even conceived its national counternarcotics strategy, and in March 1994, the strategy was still a work in progress (USDOS 1994 INCSR 118). By 1995, the US Department of State characterized Peru's counternarcotics strategy as a "comprehensive national plan for drug prevention and control" (USDOS 1995 INCSR 99). This pivotal plan envisioned reducing Peru's coca farming population by 50 percent by the year 2000 (USDOS 1995 INCSR 99). Clearly, success toward this end is more difficult to measure than is actual cultivation. As a result, the United States' metrics have always centered on production, eradication, and seizures. Likewise Peru's national counternarcotics goals have evolved toward these more measurable factors.

As is depicted in table 3.1, "Peruvian Coca Production and Eradication," (page 20) annual coca cultivation reached an all-time high in 1992 and hovered well over 100,000 hectares through the mid-1990s. Cultivation began its dramatic decline in 1996, which witnessed an 18-percent drop from the preceding year. In 1997 and 1998, cultivation decreased another 27 and

26 percent, respectively. These reductions are not directly attributable to coca eradication, which did not increase commensurately. Eradication, however, does have a deterrent effect because it threatens farmers with unexpected crop and income loss. The US government attributes the monumental decline in cultivation to both effective air interdiction and improved law enforcement activities (USDOS 1998 INCSR 100). The key military organization credited for this success is the Peruvian Air Force, whose Airbridge Denial Program has effectively interdicted illicit airlift between Peru and Colombia since 1995. The traffickers' limitation on shipping coca base from and money into Peru created coca surpluses within Peru's cultivation zones; this in turn caused coca prices to plummet to levels below actual cultivation costs (USDOS 1998 INCSR 101). Consequently, many farmers—finding themselves unable to make a profit—simply abandoned their coca fields (USDOS 1998 INCSR 101). Between 1996 and 1999, farmers abandoned approximately 60,000 hectares of coca plantations, 27,000 hectares of which were subsequently used to plant commercial crops ("Coca" 405). Lamentably, in August 1999, the Peruvian government announced that many farmers who had embraced alternative development had returned to more profitable coca production as the market price of the coca leaf rose throughout the year ("Coca" 405). Therefore, one should not be surprised if 1999 cultivation figures (scheduled to be published by the US Department of State in April 2000) exceed those of the previous two years.

The Peruvian Air Force and National Police share responsibility for controlling Peru's municipal airports; together they have not only performed law enforcement activities at legitimate airports, but also shut-down a number of clandestine airstrips (USDOS 1998 INCSR 119). The effectiveness of this air interdiction campaign has forced shipments to terrestrial, inland waterway, and maritime routes (USDOS 1999 INCSR). In response, the Peruvian Coast

**Table 1. Peruvian Coca Production and Eradication**

YEAR	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998
HARVESTABLE CULTIVATION (hectares)	120,400	121,300	120,800	129,100	108,800	108,600	115,300	94,400	68,800	51,000
ERADICATED (hectares)	1,285	15,555 *	13,464 *	6,138 *	6,000 *	4,960 *	0 **	1,259 (+ 3.6 *)	3,463 (+ 6 *)	7825
HARVESTABLE LEAF (metric tons)	186,300	196,900	222,700	223,900	155,500	165,300	183,600	174,700	130,600	30,064
POTENTIAL COCAINE HYDROCHLORIDE (metric tons)	-	490	525	550	410	435	460	435	325	240

\* Denotes seedbed eradication. Totals have been converted (by source) to mature cultivation equivalents.

\*\* There was no coca eradication 1995. Seedbed eradication totals are not readily available, as the US Department of State 1996 INCSR erroneously cited 1994 figures rather than those for 1995.

Source: US Department of State (USDOS), 1999 *International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR)*, USDOS 1998 INCSR 104; USDOS 1997 INCSR 106; USDOS 1996 INCSR 105; USDOS 1995 INCSR 106; USDOS 1994 INCSR, 119; USDOS 1993 INCSR 126; USDOS 1992 INCSR 130; US Department of State, 1991 INCSR 119.

**Table 2. Peruvian Cocaine Seizures**

YEAR	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998
COCA LEAF (metric tons)	-	38.52	5.95	25.0	-	25.2	33.4	99.1	146.8	132.9
PASTE, BASE, and HYDROCHLORIDE (metric tons)	2.1	8.50	5.17	6.93	5.77	10.70	22.65	19.69	11.10	21.40

Source: USDOS 1999 INCSR, n.p.; USDOS, 1992 INCSR, 130

Guard and National Police Drug Directorate have established joint bases from which to conduct riverine operations (USDOS 1999 *INCSR*). The Peruvian Navy has also begun coordinated riverine activities with the National Police (USDOS 1999 *INCSR*). Tables 3.1. and 3.2 (on the preceding page) reflect the effectiveness of the security forces' concerted counternarcotics campaign.

Based on this success, Peru's 1997 "National Plan for Alternative Development and Drug Prevention and Rehabilitation" established an impressive goal of reducing illicit coca production 50 percent by 2001 (1999 *INCSR*). This objective seems attainable in light of the 56% reduction witnessed between 1995 and December 1998. The Minister of Health has set an even more aggressive milestone: the elimination of all illegal coca production by 2007 (USDOS 1998 *INCSR* 100). Despite Peru's tremendous recent accomplishments, this goal seems to be beyond reach, as it would require substantial funding for alternative development programs. Moreover, insurgent activity within the cultivation zones limits the government's ability to maximize its operational effectiveness in the drug war. The attractiveness of financial payoffs will probably help ensure that governmental corruption continues, further limiting overall success. A final obstacle to Peru's attaining drug-free status is the country's eradication policy. Based on President Fujimori's explicit ban, herbicidal eradication is prohibited (USDOS 1994 *INCSR* 118). Consequently, the government relies exclusively on manual eradication efforts, which are far less efficient and effective. Although the Peruvian drug war probably is of higher priority to the United States than to Peru, the Peruvian military and police have made significant strides in eliminating the scourge. The military has also been successful in reducing the insurgent groups' ability to influence drug production. One must keep in mind that coca production poses a greater threat to the United States and Europe than Peru, especially once the insurgents are totally

defeated. Consequently, whether Peru's drug war is inspired more by North American economic assistance or a genuine desire to do what is morally right remains to be seen. Whatever Peru's true policy and motivation may be, the security forces have performed their counternarcotics job admirably.

### **Territorial Integrity**

*A ceded territory on a nation's border is a constant memorial to its humiliation.*

— Unknown

Barry Hughes highlights that "the core interests of the state flow from its essence: territorial boundaries, population, government, and sovereignty," adding that "territorial disputes are almost certainly the most fundamental of all interstate conflicts....[and] states will...resist even the smallest redefinition of borders with the greatest intensity" (77). This is because territorial ownership essentially equates to national sovereignty. When other instruments of power fail, the daunting responsibility of preserving sovereignty rests with the given state's armed forces. Peru shares borders with Ecuador, Colombia, Brazil, Bolivia, and Chile. Of these states, those that have traditionally posed a threat to Peruvian boundaries are Chile and Ecuador.

#### **Peru-Ecuador Territorial Dispute**

The long-standing animosity between Peru and Ecuador is based on their mutual claim to a 78-kilometer segment of the border at Ecuador's southeastern tip. This stretch of land has fueled strife and acrimony since the mid-1800s, with significant armed conflicts having occurred in 1857-1860, 1887, 1937, 1940, 1981, 1984, and January to February 1995 ("What" 498). Peru's military and diplomatic machines have prevailed in each case. The most recent agreement, forged in October 1998, strikes a compromise that generally favors Peru. In a 13 May 1999

formal frontier ceremony, both countries' presidents formalized and finalized accords, potentially bringing an end to the dispute. At this May 1999 ceremony and a related February 1999 Washington D.C. function, both presidents pledged not to fund any new armament until at least 2003 ("Final"; "Presidents Secure"). They agreed that these former warring states will now devote resources once used for weapons and military preparations to overcoming the common problems of poverty and backwardness ("Final").

As is the case in any compromise, however, a vocal and sizable popular minority in each state vehemently opposes the accords. Arguably, the greatest threat to a continued peace between Peru and Ecuador comes from two powerful sources. First, the political parties that oppose Fujimori have vowed to revoke the boundary agreement should they assume power via the 2000 presidential election ("Final"). Second, prior to the accord the Peruvian military officer corps had almost unanimously maintained that Peru should grant no territorial concessions to Ecuador ("Military Resist"). Should Fujimori win the election in 2000, the military support he has enjoyed throughout his tenure may evaporate, especially if he reduces the military budget as he implied during the aforementioned frontier ceremony. Military allegiance could easily shift in favor of any of the opposition parties whose views regarding the boundary accord parallel those of the armed forces. This could very well fuel a coup from below.

### **Peru-Chile Territorial Dispute**

Diplomatic differences between Peru and Chile were fallout from their 1879-1883 War of the Pacific. Having lost the war, Peru ceded to the victor the province of Tarapaca into perpetuity and two districts (Arica and Tacna) for ten years, at which time a plebiscite would determine ownership (CIA 53-4). Forty-six years later—in a 1929 revision to the 1883 Treaty of Ancón—Chile returned one district to Peru, while keeping Arica (CIA 54). Although Chile built

port facilities in Arica for Peruvian use, Peru's loss of Arica has been a haunting memory since its initial loss. On 30 November 1999, however President Fujimori made the peace by formally accepting the terms of the 1929 Treaty of Ancón during the first visit to Chile by a Peruvian head of state in 120 years (i.e., since the War of the Pacific) ("Fujimori Makes" 573). The outcome of the War of the Pacific engendered antagonism between Chile and Peru, but not military conflict. Based on Chile's military strength and Peru's having formalized its pre-existing realization that the land ceded to Chile after the War of the Pacific is forever lost, the Peru-Chile scenario poses an insignificant threat to Peru's democratization.



## Part 4

### Conclusion

*We are bound together by geography, by history, by culture, but most important, now by shared values—a ferocious devotion to freedom, democracy, social justice and determination to improve the lives of all our people.”*

— President Clinton, 1994 Summit of the Americas

The Peruvian armed forces have demonstrated their ability to combat effectively the principal non-governmental threats to Peru's democratization, namely insurgency and the narcotics trade. Peru's recent accords with Ecuador and Chile have hopefully eliminated the probability of future interstate conflict. Lamentably, the Peru-Ecuador agreement may only serve to destabilize domestic Peruvian politics and, by extension, interstate relations.

Peru's military undisputedly bears the responsibility of providing for territorial security (against a questionable foreign foe). More importantly, the United Nations argues that since the cold war's end, the narrow definition of security has expanded beyond territorial defense and protection of national interests. As the traditional emphasis on states continues its shift more toward people, human security—comprised of freedom from fear and freedom from want—will revolutionize the 21st century (UN Development Program, 229-30). Peruvian military forces must adapt to this revolution, for they can ensure freedom from fear by protecting the populace from the brutal insurgency that has ravaged the country. The military must also ensure it is not the source of fear. In other words, all its actions must be predicated on a fundamental

appreciation of the democratic process and unconditional respect for human rights. Though the military's record in the human rights arena still leaves considerable room for improvement, few could dispute that it has improved markedly since 1985. This paper established the correlation between military human rights violations and Peru's insurgency movements. One can reasonably expect that as the insurgents are rendered impotent and ultimately defeated, adherence to human rights norms will become increasingly prevalent.

Some have asserted that the total defeat of the insurgent movements was the underlying motive behind Fujimori's self-coup (Burt "Unsettled"). If this is true, then the insurgency lies at the hub of past and present governmental disregard for the principles of democratic governance. By extension, total defeat of the insurgent threat should be the key to the government's future appreciation for internationally accepted democratic values. Fujimori's post-coup popular support stems from the public's recognition that drastic measures are required in dire times. Since Peru has virtually pulled itself out of the abyss of insurgent anarchy, the public will surely expect a return to genuine democratic rule. The military, having chosen to support President Fujimori's unconstitutional activities rather than to remain apolitical, remains a principal source of the president's power. Should he lose the 9 April 2000 election, we can only hope that he will accept his defeat graciously and not use his power base to remain in office forcibly. Equally important, we must be watchful for the possibility that his victory could precipitate a military coup from below and his resultant overthrow.

A final critical milestone on Peru's path to democracy is the military's future relevance. As the threat of insurgency diminishes and is hopefully eliminated, and as Peru's traditional international enemies (Chile and Ecuador) become allies, the government must pursue one of two courses of action vis-à-vis the armed forces. It must either identify domestic roles, beyond

narcotics control, that will allow the military to remain gainfully employed, or consider a reduction in force and budget. The latter option will surely be a tough pill for the military to swallow and may, in and of itself, catalyze a coup. As Nordlinger points out, "civilian impingements upon the military's autonomy and exclusiveness generate powerful interventionist motives" (49). At the same time, the military's quest to remain a relevant force may lead to their creating illegitimate work for themselves. For example, the institution could endeavor to ensure that Ecuador and Chile remain enemies of the state. This is a possible scenario should Peru's hawks ascend to the presidency. As an alternative means of preserving their own livelihood, the armed forces may take underhanded steps to ensure insurgency and drug trafficking remain threats. Clearly, 2000 will be a defining year in Peru's democratization process and may represent the commencement of a significant domestic transition—for better or for worse.

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